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An idea fundamental to cognitive science is that it may be pos-
sible to describe our thought processes through some representa-
tional system. Whether the appropriate representational system 
has properties similar to linguistic properties (such as observing 
similar principles) is an open question that scholars will no doubt 
be debating for years. Here, however, I’d like to address related 
questions, ones that I believe we can answer together: Do we think 
in language? Could we think without a language?
One way to interpret these questions is as follows: Does lan-
guage construct a mental world that cognitively fences us in? 
This might well be a familiar question to you since it is frequently 
debated.
One can also interpret these questions in the most mundane 
way, the way people do when they say things such as “It’s so noisy 
I can’t hear myself think”—that is, asking whether human beings 
think in speciﬁ c human languages. In other words, do people 
from Italy think in Italian? Or, given that the Italian language 
has many dialects, we could break down this basic question into 
multiple ones such as these: Do Venetians think in Venetian? Do 
Neapolitans think in Napoletano? Likewise, do Indians, Austra-
lians, Canadians, Americans, Nigerians, and the British think in 
their own national varieties of English? We can get nicer: Do Bos-
tonians and Atlantans and Philadelphians think in their urban 



































Does language equal thought? 51
 varieties? With either interpretation, the rest of this chapter aims 
to convince you that the answer to these questions is no.
I am ﬁ rst going to argue that thought does not require lan-
guage by giving you instances of thought that couldn’t possi-
bly have been formulated in the brain in terms of language. 
The argument is a little long, so please keep that end point in 
sight.
Think about living with a toddler. Let me give you ﬁ ve sce-
narios that I’ve witnessed—three typical, two just plain wonder-
ful—in which children did not use spoken or sign language. Then 
I bring out their relevance as a group to the central question of 
this chapter.
1. A boy plows a plastic truck across frozen grass. Another boy
comes over, watches for a while, and then throws a handful of 
dirt on the ﬁ rst boy. The ﬁ rst boy picks up his truck, takes it to 
the area behind the swing set, and resumes plowing there.
2. My grandniece is coloring vehemently, and she rips the
paper with the crayon. She takes another piece of paper, tapes it 
over the rip, and continues coloring.
3. A girl in the grocery store reaches for candy at the checkout
aisle. Her mother says she can’t have it. The girl throws a 
tantrum. Her mother’s cheeks ﬂ ame, and she gives the girl the 
candy.
4. Some three-year-olds sit in a line at the edge of a swimming
pool, all of them with their feet dangling in the water. A man is 
teaching them to swim. He takes the ﬁ rst child on one end of the 
line and dunks him. That boy laughs. The instructor lifts him out 
of the pool, and the boy goes to the other end of the line. The 
instructor does the same to the next child, working his way along 



































Language: The Human Ability52
of the line. When the instructor lifts the third child, my daughter 
reaches both hands into the pool, splashes herself, then runs to 
the end of the line—with the children who have already been 
dunked.
5. A boy goes to the beach with his family. The family on the
next blanket has a blind child. The two children start digging 
together. At one point the mother of the ﬁ rst boy calls him over 
for a snack of carrot sticks. The boy takes his bag to the other 
boy and holds it out for him. When the blind boy doesn’t react, 
the ﬁ rst boy takes the blind boy’s hand (so beautifully covered 
with sand) and sticks it into the plastic bag. They share sandy 
carrots.
All of these scenarios give evidence of reasoning on the part 
of the child and, thus, of thought. Perhaps you disagree with me 
about one or another, but surely you agree about at least one. Now 
we are almost ready to approach the question of the relationship 
of thought to language in these types of scenarios.
But ﬁ rst let’s consider one more situation. Consider the 
case of a hard-of-hearing or completely deaf child born to 
hearing parents. Often the fact that the child in this situation 
does not (adequately) hear is not detected until the child is 
a toddler or older. This is the case because the child exhib-
its behavior that is typical of toddlers—behavior precisely like 
that described in the preceding scenarios. That is, deaf chil-
dren act just like hearing children in these sorts of situations. 
Yet deaf children whose deafness has not yet been discovered 
are linguistically deprived. Only after someone recognizes that 
these children don’t hear can linguistic information be given 
to them—whether in the form of access to spoken language 



































Does language equal thought? 53
(what we used to call “lip-reading”), and/or lessons in vocaliza-
tion or in the form of teaching the child (and often the whole 
family) to use sign language.
In other words, long before these deaf children have access to 
linguistic input, they do think, as is obvious from their thought-
demonstrating behavior. There is no possibility, however, that 
their thought is in a speciﬁ c human language since they have not 
even begun to acquire any speciﬁ c human language.
A similar kind of argument can be made by looking at the 
studies of Genie, a young girl who was discovered in 1970 in Los 
Angeles, living in captive isolation that limited both her physical 
activity and linguistic input (also discussed in chapter 1). At the 
time of her discovery, she could hardly walk and gave no indica-
tion of knowing what speech was. Several researchers worked for 
years to teach Genie language, and although she never progressed 
beyond an unsystematic stringing together of a few words, she 
did manage to talk about the events of her life, including events 
that had happened prior to her gaining linguistic knowledge. 
Clearly, these memories constitute thought—thought that was 
 independent of linguistic structure.
Another way to argue that thought is not equivalent to spe-
ciﬁ c language is to consider our vocabulary. If a language has a 
word for a given concept and another language lacks a word for 
that concept, does it follow that the given concept is mentally 
accessible to people of the ﬁ rst language and inaccessible to people 
of the second? That is, do the two sets of speakers think differ-
ently?
In answering this question, consider your own experiences in 
life. When you meet a new word, are you necessarily meeting a 
new concept? Let’s say that I ask you to mix yellow and blue paints 



































Language: The Human Ability54
Along the way, you happen to mix up chartreuse, but you don’t 
know the particular word chartreuse. If I tell you that the mix in 
one bowl is called chartreuse, all I’ve done is given you a label. 
However, you already recognized the concept, or you wouldn’t 
have put it in one of the bowls. That is, unless you are blind or col-
or-blind, the actual qualities of the color precede your labeling of 
it. To take a more familiar example, in the United States, in voting 
booths many states have ballots that are punched by machine. The 
little parts that fall out of the ballot when it is punched are called 
chads. Before the presidential election of 2000, many Americans 
didn’t know the word chad, but they were nevertheless familiar 
with the concept.
In these types of situations it seems rather obvious that the 
concept of an object can be understood without a word for that 
object, but what about a situation in which the concept concerns 
the identiﬁ cation not of a concrete object but rather of an abstract 
one?
Let me present two examples, contrasting English and Italian, 
as we consider whether the vocabulary difference between the two 
languages reveals a difference in thought possibilities. Italian lacks 
a vocabulary item corresponding to the English word privacy. Are 
we to conclude, then, that Italians do not understand the concept? 
Surely this is not a proper conclusion, and a simple observation 
of Italians’ habits reveals this fact. Italians close the door when 
they use a public bathroom, they do not have sexual relations in 
public, and they do not ask personal questions of people they are 
not intimate with. In other words, they respect privacy regardless 
of the fact that they have no single word denoting that concept. 
So, although they will use a circumlocution to translate “Please 
respect my privacy,” they understand the concept and communi-



































Does language equal thought? 55
as ‘private’; they simply have a lexical gap (from an English per-
spective) when it comes to the relevant noun.
On the other hand, Italian has the word scaramanzia, for 
which I know no single vocabulary item of English that can serve 
as a translation. Scaramanzia is the superstition that makes us say 
that the worst is going to happen in order to ward it off. For exam-
ple, both my sisters had breast cancer, so I told my doctor (among 
others) that I’m bound to get it. However, my fervent hope is 
that I won’t, and there’s an ignorant but nonetheless real sense in 
me that by saying I will get it, I’ve robbed that terrible evil of its 
power. I’ve been doing things like that all my life, long before I had 
ever heard the word scaramanzia. And now that I’ve described this 
to you, I’m sure you understand the concept (which doesn’t mean 
that you share my ignorant attraction to magic), whether you’ve 
ever practiced this behavior or not. Although most Italians and 
Americans do not practice this behavior regularly, the fact that 
people of both cultures understand the concept and occasionally 
practice it shows that understanding the concept is independent of 
having a vocabulary item in one’s language that denotes it.
In sum, the presence and lack of the words privacy and scara-
manzia in Italian and English tell us nothing whatsoever about 
differences between the ways English speakers and Italian speakers 
think.
Analogous arguments can be made by looking at vocabulary 
differences in any two languages. German has the word Schaden-
freude, which is a compound of the root for ‘damage’ and the root 
for ‘joy.’ Schadenfreude is the pleasure one takes in the misfor-
tunes of others. Although you might not have experienced this 
pleasure, nor might many Germans, you can understand the con-
cept regardless of the fact that English has no such word. Often 



































Language: The Human Ability56
we recognize that they experience Schadenfreude. One language 
will coin a word for a given concept, whereas another lan-
guage will not. Scholars of various disciplines (psychology, soci-
ology) might debate the reasons for this, but the important point 
for us is simply that the speakers of both languages can under-
stand the concept, regardless.
You might argue that the existence of a word for a concept in 
a given language in some way legitimizes or licenses the concept 
in that linguistic community. That is, we have a word for it, so the 
concept must be shared by many and is, therefore, somehow more 
true or real than it might be without a linguistic label. This could 
be right. Nevertheless, the licensing of a concept is distinct from 
the ability to grasp it. In the college where I work, many ﬁ rst-year 
students enter with the fear that our highly selective admissions 
committee made a mistake and they don’t belong here. We have 
no single word for this fear (which is shared by ﬁ rst-year students 
on many campuses, no doubt), but it’s easy to recognize and under-
stand.
Vocabulary differences are not the only differences between 
languages, so we should turn now to other types of differences and 
ask what they tell us about the relationships between language and 
thought. Some scholars have argued that a certain population can-
not reason in the same way as another population because of syntac-
tic differences between the languages of the two populations. Instead 
of reporting on that literature (which would require a lengthy dis-
cussion), I’ll present an analogous situation that has not been widely 
discussed in this light. We will look again at a contrast between Ital-
ian and English, this time focusing on sentence structure.
In English we can say, “John beat the eggs stiff,” meaning that 
John beat the eggs with the result that they became stiff. The word 



































Does language equal thought? 57
Romance languages the literal translation of that sentence is not 
grammatical because Romance languages do not allow resultative 
secondary predicates in as wide a range of sentence structures as 
English does. Instead, in a Romance language you’d say something 
that would be translated literally as ‘John beat the eggs until they 
became stiff ’ or ‘John beat the eggs to the point of (their) being 
stiff.’ A person who holds to the idea that thought is language 
might try to use this information to argue that Italians, Spaniards, 
Romanians, French, Portuguese, and speakers of other Romance 
languages cannot understand the concept of direct result. But that’s 
obviously false. Speakers of Romance languages clearly understand 
the concept of direct result; they simply have available a different 
range of sentence structures to render it.
Analogous arguments can be built around other sentence 
structure differences between languages. For example, some lan-
guages express possession by a verb that can be translated as ‘have.’ 
Others, however, express it in other ways, such as by stating exis-
tence with respect to something else. For example, to express 
‘I have a sister’ in Russian, one would say u menja sestra. A word-
by-word translation of this is ‘with-me-sister.’ (Note that there is 
no verb here. Typically the verb that means ‘be’ is omitted when 
the present tense is to be conveyed.) Does that mean that the 
speakers of the ﬁ rst type of language (including English) have a 
different sense of possession from the speakers of the second type 
of language (including Russian)? In particular, do we think of sis-
ters differently? At a certain point, the proposition that structural 
differences between languages are evidence of differences in con-
ceptual behavior between peoples leads to nonsense. In my opin-
ion, this is one of those times.
Another argument that language and thought are not equiva-



































Language: The Human Ability58
do it much too often, are surprised at what we have said, and then 
correct it. In fact, we can even read without thinking, coming to 
the end of the page and realizing that we have no idea what we’ve 
just read. Sometimes we can read aloud, thus indisputably using our 
language mechanism, and still think about something else, so that 
we lose our place in the passage and don’t even know what we’ve 
read and what we haven’t. Similarly, if you’ve ever heard particu-
larly verbal preschoolers speak, you’ll be amazed by their ﬂ uency 
and ability to express even abstract concepts, for example when 
talking about future events. In the following sentence, for instance, 
uttered by a three-year-old boy whose grandfather lives in a differ-
ent country and only gets to visit him once or twice a year, the boy 
expresses something about a future event, without really having a 
concept of time: “I’m putting all these things in a bag for grandpa 
because when he comes and we ﬁ x the bench together, we need 
this.” A moment later, the boy could be throwing a tantrum about 
not being able to go to the playground right that moment but hav-
ing to wait until a little later, demonstrating that future events are 
hard for him to integrate into his thinking. It is obvious, then, that 
preschoolers’ reasoning ability lags far behind their speaking ability. 
This is particularly striking evidence that language (whether in the 
form of speaking or reading) and thought cannot be one and the 
same, nor are they even necessarily dependent on each another.
Many more arguments can be brought to bear on the ques-
tion of whether thought equals language. We could ask whether 
animals think, and if our answer is positive (as mine is), we must 
abandon the notion that thought is language since animals do not 
have language in the sense that humans do (a point discussed in 
chapter 6). We could ask whether people who have brain disease 
or injury that robs them of language still think, and if our answer 



































Does language equal thought? 59
without looking at the vast amount of research on animals and on 
language pathologies, that is, without looking at research that goes 
beyond our daily experience, we can debunk certain myths about 
language simply by looking at the evidence available in everyday 
life. The myth that we think in speciﬁ c languages is one of those 
debunkable myths, as we’ve already seen.
This conclusion does not minimize the importance of the var-
ious relationships that hold between language and thought. Lan-
guage facilitates the introduction and transmission of thoughts, 
and a particular phrasing of a concept can give it a slant that 
offers the listener a new perspective. Sometimes we may not 
even be quite sure of our thoughts until we put them into lan-
guage, which is one reason that talking to a conﬁ dant when mak-
ing crucial decisions can be so valuable. Speaking one’s mind or 
writing one’s ideas can also help one to recognize the form of a 
particular rational argument one is developing. Using language 
can help us in analysis of many types, just as drawing what we 
saw can help us understand its signiﬁ cance. Nonetheless, the 
drawing is not tantamount to the act of seeing; likewise, express-
ing oneself in language is not tantamount to the act of  thinking.
Language is like a hanger that we put our thoughts on. When 
the clothing is in a pile on the ﬂ oor, it might be harder to recog-
nize it for what it truly is. The structure of the hanger clariﬁ es the 
structure of the clothing, but clariﬁ cation of an essence is distinct 
from the essence itself.
In sum, whether or not we have words for concepts, we can 
and do entertain those concepts, and some concepts we may never 
have words for—because they are ineffable.
I want to close with a ﬁ nal consideration, which again con-
nects to daily experience—one I’d simply like to pose. Observe the 



































Language: The Human Ability60
I hate snakes.
Do you remember Mrs. Bicknell?
Our eighth-grade social studies teacher?
Yes.
Sure, I remember her. Why?
Well, when you said snakes, I remembered the day I went to 
talk to her after school about how my family was falling 
apart, and she asked me what the matter was and if 
Patrick had walked some other girl home, and she was 
so condescending that I just left and walked home alone 
and saw this twisted stick by the sidewalk, and I said, 
“You look like a crazy snake. Hello, you crazy snake.” 
I thought I was alone, but Patrick was walking right 
behind me, and he said, “I always thought you were 
crazy, but now I know.”
Oh.
When the second speaker goes into that long speech, you can see 
how much thought she’s reporting—thought that apparently took 
place between the ﬁ rst utterance (“I hate snakes.”) and the second 
(“Do you remember Mrs. Bicknell?”) If all of that thought took 
place in actual English sentences, it would have had to come at a 
remarkable speed. In addition, although the production of English 
in this long thought between the ﬁ rst and the second utterance 
would be free of speech production—and thus free of the slow-
ness of the speech articulators (the tongue, the lips, the bottom 
jaw, and all the other parts of the body that participate in speech 
production)—it is still a stream of silent words, which if spoken 
would come as fast as a voice recording increased to a continu-
ous squeak. The speed of thought exceeds that of speech, of the 



































Does language equal thought? 61
silent language possibly be that fast? Ideally, we should design an 
experiment to measure the speed of silent language at this point. If 
we cannot do that, if we cannot devise some way to test whether 
or not silent language has the characteristics of thought (such as 
great speed), we are left in an unsupported position.
But even without experimental evidence, we can push the 
hypothesis—that language and thought are equivalent—to an 
absurd end by considering the language and thought of Deaf peo-
ple (by Deaf with a capital “D,” I mean people whose primary lan-
guage is a sign language) with regard to speed. Signs generally take 
about twice as long to produce as words. So do Deaf people think 
twice as slowly as hearing people (since they would be thinking in 
visual signs)? Moreover, some Deaf people have mastered spoken 
languages. I have such friends, and they speak English at the ordi-
nary rate. So do these Deaf people think at double the rate when 
they are speaking as when they are signing? The proposal, again, 
is nonsensical to me.
Thought is thought. Language is language. The two are 
distinct.
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